The Rohingya Refugee Crisis
By Jeremy Wilson – Research Coordinator | Same Skies*
In May 2015, hundreds of Rohingya asylum seekers found themselves stranded in the Bay of Bengal after being abandoned by people smugglers. A recent crackdown on people smuggling in Thailand had disrupted long established trafficking routes1. Consequently, smugglers started a new trend of abandoning their human cargo at sea when at risk of being caught by authorities. Prior to this recent crackdown, the preferred route for people smugglers involved an oversea journey into Southern Thailand, where asylum seekers would be hidden and sometimes kept hostage in the jungle before moving overland into Malaysia or by sea to Indonesia 2 . From Malaysia, Rohingya usually reached Indonesia through a 6 to 8 hour journey across the Strait of Malacca that typically costs around $500 to $1000 US dollars3. Unfortunately, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia initially refused to accept the Rohingya during the May 2015 crisis, who were severely dehydrated, starving and for some, close to death by this stage. Several times both Thailand and Malaysia pushed boats full of refugees back to sea4. Indonesia ordered customs authorities and the Navy to also turn away the boats of refugees, while fisherman were ordered not to help the Rohingya, unless people were in the water and/or a boat was sinking5. Fortunately, all three countries eventually agreed to host the Rohingya for a period of one year, until they are resettled to a new country.
Given Sumatra’s status as a common entry point to Indonesia for asylum seekers transiting through the region, the refugee and asylum seeker population is growing rapidly. According to the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s population statistics for 2014 the number of refugees and asylum seekers in North Sumatra are 1,6776. In June 2014, there were 224 refugees and asylum seekers known to be in the city of Medan alone7. According to the immigration office in Medan, the number in the city has now risen to over 400 people8. North Sumatra plays host to refugees and asylum seekers from a number of diverse backgrounds. Most of these people in North Sumatra originate from countries such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia and Sri Lanka9, with some originating from numerous other countries including Sudan, Iran, China, and Palestine10. Provided such information is available for all groups, demographic data covers both refugees and asylum seekers in North Sumatra11 12. In addition to the number of refugees and asylum seekers living in the community throughout North Sumatra and Aceh, a significant number of people of concern are detained in the Belawan Immigration Detention Centre (IDC). As of 19 May 2015, 385 refugees and asylum seekers were in detention at Belawan IDC13. However, the May 2015 Rohingya crisis has significantly increased the population of refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia. The situation of the Rohingya in Indonesia has become a priority for the government and humanitarian organisations working in the country.
The Muslim Rohingya of Myanmar
Earlier this year, in an agreement with Thailand and Malaysia, Indonesia agreed to temporarily accommodate Rohingya and Bangladeshi asylum seekers. Currently under the care of the immigration office and International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Rohingya and Bangladeshi refugees and asylum seekers are currently being sheltered at numerous locations throughout North Sumatra and Aceh. Since 10 May 2015, over 3500 Rohingya and Bangladeshi have been rescued in the waters off Sumatra14.
Typically restricted to pockets of Western Myanmar, the Muslim Rohingya are an ethnic minority that are often cited as amongst the world’s most persecuted people. The majority of the Rohingya are confined to several townships of North Rakhine in Western Myanmar15. Because the Rohingya are regarded as illegal immigrants, they are not recognised as one of the national ethnicities of Myanmar. For the most part, the Rohingya are stateless and are denied access to human rights in their home country. Portrayed and often referred to as ‘Bengali’ migrants in public and official discourse, the government of Myanmar actively denies the Rohingya ethnic identity16. Denial of the existence of a Rohingya identity is the official government position and symptomatic of genocide. In 2013, Win Myaing, an official Rakhine State Government spokesperson responded when asked about ethnic cleansing and the Rohingya in Myanmar, “How can it be ethnic cleansing? They are not an ethnic group.”17 Modern ethnic conflict and civil attitudes against the Rohingya in Myanmar are ultimately the consequence of three decades of institutionalised persecution and demonisation that is perpetuated by both the government and prominent Buddhist leaders in the country.
In 1989, the government introduced ‘Citizen Scrutiny Cards’, a system of colour-coded cards for different citizenship status. The Rohingya were never issued with any such cards, and as non- citizens of Myanmar, they do not fall under any of the various categories18. The government argues that the term ‘Rohingya’ itself is an invention and that the group does not exist as a distinct ethnic people. In 1992, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar claimed that; “Historically, there has never been a ‘Rohingya’ race in Myanmar. The very name Rohingya is a creation of a group of insurgents in the Rakhine State” 19 . Such institutional denial of ethnicity and citizenship, combined with statements that criminalise the identity of the Rohingya has ultimately culminated in persecution against the Muslim minority on both official and communal levels.
Because the Rohingya are denied citizenship and access to their human rights, they have very little control over the most basic affairs in their lives. They must seek permission from the government for most things. Without approval, the Rohingya have no right to own property, marry or even have children20. As such, one could argue that such restrictions against the freedom to reproduce are aimed to slowly breed the Rohingya from Myanmar. Such a practice also fits within the definition of genocide.
The strict regulations against the Rohingya are a form of containment. Rohingya are prohibited to freely travel between townships without official permission. In order to travel, Rohingya must obtain travel permits from the local Peace and Development Council (PDC). These permits are valid for 45 days, with copies to be submitted to authorities upon departure and arrival21. Similarly, permits must also be obtained for overnight stays22. To ensure the restricted movement of the Rohingya, Myanmar’s elite border police, the NaSaKa, conduct night raids to check occupant numbers against official records23. Restrictions against travel have broad implications and also affect the ability of the Rohingya to access medical care. As a direct consequence of such travel restrictions, the Rohingya face difficulty accessing medical and emergency service24. Additionally, strict travel restrictions make the Rohingya vulnerable to extortion, with reports that authorities have sought bribes to approve permits25. It is also likely that these travel restrictions impede the ability of Rohingya to earn an income, particularly farmers who need access to markets to sell their goods.
It is also reported that the Rohingya are subject to forced labor. In Myanmar, forced labor is imposed on the Rohingya by both the government and the military, generally working for profit generating industries and in construction26. Enforced by the NaSaKa border force and the PDC, Rohingya as young as 7 years old are required to offer labour to the state every 2 alternate days. When the military requires labourers, it is generally required for 7 to 15 days27. In some cases where authorities have enforced involuntary labor, it has caused forced removal of the Rohingya28. Failure to comply or satisfactorily complete work carries severe penalties. Punishments range from fines of 800 Kyat to more punitive measures, such as physical threats, abuse and in some cases, death29. Such conditions for the Rohingya are borne from dehumanisation and institutionalised disregard for their human rights.
Public discourse disseminated by the state and prominent religious leaders entrenches the attitudes that dehumanise and encourage discrimination against the Rohingya. The Sangha (the local order of Buddhist monks) and the Rakhine National Development Party (RNDP) are two of the most influential groups in Western Myanmar30. Building up to the June 2012 violence against the Rohingya, both groups were active in publically inciting violence against the Muslim minority. Government officials made public statements and the Sangha distributed anti-Muslim pamphlets that encouraged violence and ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya31. The ensuing violence that broke out against Rohingya and Kaman Muslims and destroyed entire villages 32 , created approximately 40,000 displaced people33. Soon after the violence, Buddhist monks publically called for economic and social isolation of the Rohingya34. With tensions still simmering, violence broke out once again in October 2012. Civilians attacked entire villages, destroying homes and religious buildings35 . The government of Myanmar claimed that the death total came to 192 people. However, it is possible that the number is higher as Human Rights Watch reported that villages were seen digging at least 4 mass graves in the aftermath of the 2012 violence36. The violence that erupted against the Rohingya in June and October 2012 was a direct consequence of a governmental complicity that fostered social tension between ethnic and religious groups. The hostile conditions that the Rohingya endured before and after the 2012 violence made life very difficult in Myanmar. Ultimately, it is for the above-mentioned reasons that the Rohingya are compelled to flee to Bangladesh, and eventually to Indonesia.
Subject to institutionalised discrimination, social exclusion and victim to sporadic bursts of communal violence, the Rohingya are effectively pushed out of Myanmar. Rohingya flee to neighboring countries such as Bangladesh and India where the situation is similarly difficult. Despite endemic poverty37, Bangladesh is most often the first country of asylum for Rohingya fleeing persecution in Myanmar. Rohingya generally prefer Bangladesh over India as the Bangladeshi culture is more similar to their own 38 . In the past, Bangladesh has welcomed Rohingya. However, in more recent times Bangladesh has become increasingly apprehensive of sheltering the Rohingya, due to the delicate geopolitical situation in the region and its strategic relationship with Myanmar39. Unfortunately, the situation for refugees and asylum seekers in Bangladesh has become increasingly precarious and the Rohingya commonly find themselves victim to persecution and exploitation from authorities, smugglers and local populations.
It is reported that authorities such as the NaSaKa border force and the Navy have taken the opportunity to exploit the vulnerabilities of Rohingya attempting to flee into neighboring countries. Human Rights Watch reported that boats of Rohingya departing from Myanmar have been forced to pay the NaSaKa as much as 100,000 Kyat ($111AUD) and/or the Navy 50,000 Kyat ($55.5AUD) in addition to the expensive fees extracted by people smugglers 40 . Even after reaching Bangladesh, the Rohingya remain vulnerable to authorities and the local populations.
In Bangladesh, self settled refugees and asylum seekers have heightened difficulty accessing the limited humanitarian assistance available. People who do not lodge their asylum claims are often unknown to UNHCR, as the agency lacks the capacity to actively seek out and engage with the self settled population41. Lacking assistance from humanitarian organisations such as UNHCR, Rohingya often seek illegal employment or rely on meager remittances from relatives. Refugees and asylum seekers who do not reside in refugee camps squat illegally on government land and are vulnerable to forced removal42. Additionally, without a valid visa or relevant documentation refugees and asylum seekers in Bangladesh face up to five years imprisonment or deportation under the Foreigners Act43. Although living conditions for self settled refugees and asylum seekers might be difficult, the situation in Bangladeshi camps is arguably no better.
Without the right to work, Rohingya in Bangladesh rely on adaptable methods of generating income. Some Rohingya sell wares such as fishing nets or firewood at market to generate income44. Although refugees and asylum seekers have no legal right to work in Bangladesh outside of refugee camps, the Rohingya become engaged in illegal employment with the help of corrupt authorities. It is reported that authorities make deals with refugees and asylum seekers to help them leave the camps and work illegally in nearby towns and villages45. However, even though these people are lucky enough to earn some kind of wage, they are still vulnerable to exploitation and theft. Working in dangerous conditions, many Rohingya are engaged in illegal logging along the border that separates Myanmar and Bangladesh46. Others work in the service sector as cooks, rickshaw drivers or tailors47. Earning as little as $0.70USD per day, Rohingya receive poor wages due to the over supply of employable individuals from the Leda, Kutupalong and Nayapara refugee camps48. In comparison, the average daily income for Bangladeshi workers is approximately $1.08USD per day49.
Conditions in Bangladeshi refugee camps are reportedly among the worlds worst50. Refugee camps in Bangladesh are ill equipped to provide assistance to people staying there. Conditions can be harsh, ultimately compelling them to look further abroad for safety and security. It is alleged that corporal punishment, rape and other abuses committed by authorities and the local population are common in the refugee camps51. Bangladesh finds it difficult to handle the large numbers of people fleeing from Myanmar. The UN estimates that more than 88,000 Rohingya have fled Myanmar since 201452, many of them have flooded the refugee camps of Bangladesh. Because the government and UNHCR are both ill prepared to help refugees and asylum seekers, the Rohingya experience poor hygiene, malnutrition and lack of adequate water in Bangladeshi camps53. Despite the lack of resources and assistance that is available, refugees and asylum seekers in Bangladesh are denied permission to work outside the camps, as the government perceives access to the job market as local integration54. Faced with a situation where it is near impossible for refugees and asylum seekers to meet their needs, many become desperate. Out of sheer desperation, some Rohingyan women have been lured into the sex trade55. All too often, people who become involved in the sex trade fall victim to human traffickers and are sold into global sex or slave markets56. The lack of available assistance from humanitarian organisations in Bangladesh increases the vulnerabilities of refugees and asylum seekers.
With the high rates of poverty in Bangladesh, refugees and asylum seekers taking on employment is a point of extreme tension between local people and Rohingya. Because the Rohingya will work for lower wages, they are blamed for taking all the jobs and are subject to theft and abuse from the local population. Working refugees and asylum seekers are also vulnerable because they have no rights protecting their work conditions. In addition to forcing them to work in hazardous circumstances, there are no repercussions for employers if they pay wages that are lower than promised, or refuse wages at all57. Because refugees and asylum seekers have no legal right to work, they cannot go to the authorities for help when employers treat them unfairly. Inability to earn a sufficient income and exploitation from employers is one of the reasons why Rohingya look further abroad. For instance, wages are much higher in Malaysia where Rohingya have the opportunity to earn approximately $171-228USD per month58.
As demonstrated above, adverse conditions in Bangladesh drive Rohingya to travel further abroad to countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Although refugees and asylum seekers may have the opportunity to earn better wages in parts of Southeast Asia, conditions are similarly difficult. For example, insecurity is a significant issue for refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia. It is reported that corporal punishment, arrests and deportation is common in Malaysia 59 . Additionally, the cost of living in Malaysia is significantly higher than in Indonesia60. Rather than turning back to Thailand, Bangladesh or Myanmar, where experiences have generally been traumatic, Rohingya may look on to Indonesia with the hope of eventually becoming resettled and finding peace and security.
Despite its initial resistance to accepting the Rohingya and Bangladeshi ‘boat people’, the Indonesian government with the cooperation of humanitarian organisations and the goodwill of community groups are currently capably assisting refugees and asylum seekers. Although Indonesia agreed to accommodate the Rohingya for only twelve months, based on the history of third country resettlement from Indonesia it would be unlikely for all to be resettled within this time period. However, this does not mean that Indonesia is likely to deport refugees and asylum seekers. Officials and leadership figures have shown a willingness to continue their support in the future. The Bupati of the Simeulue regency, off the west coast of Sumatra, has offered to accommodate the Rohingya who are currently in North Aceh, East Aceh Tamiang and Langsa if they are not resettled within a year61. Although the Indonesian government is currently interested in supporting the Rohingya in Sumatra, other refugees and asylum seekers do not enjoy the same level of assistance during the resettlement process. The politicalised nature of the Rohingya migration crisis in Southeast Asia offers a potential explanation for Indonesia’s supportive response. Additionally, the separation and relative independence of Aceh from Jakarta could provide further explanation to the level of hospitality accorded to the Rohingya who are being hosted in the region. Whether Indonesia continues its level of support toward the Rohingya and works to improve its capacity to assist after it is no longer politically expedient to do so remains to be seen. On the other hand, perhaps the Rohingya crisis marks an important shift in Indonesian policy and capacity to assist the overall population of refugees and asylum seekers transiting through the country.
*Jeremy Wilson is currently assessing the backgrounds, migration routes, needs and resources of refugees and asylum seekers in Medan (North Sumatra, Indonesia). He is gathering information about the situation in which they find themselves, including services available to them and existing gaps. He is proficient in Bahasa Indonesia, and has a keen interest in Indonesian affairs and refugee advocacy. Jeremy holds a Bachelor of Arts with honours, specialising in history and politics.
Same Skies is a non-religious, politically neutral non-profit organization registered in Switzerland. We are a team of passionate international professionals, committed to supporting people who identify themselves as refugees or asylum seekers. In addition, the communities with whom we work live in transit countries where they await the processing of their asylum claims, and durable solutions such as the approval for resettlement to a third country.
Our Vision: Refugees and asylum seekers in transit countries live with self-determination.
Our Mission: Contribute to the innovation of refugee protection that genuinely empowers refugee and asylum seeker communities and strengthens existing capacities.
Our Goal: Establish networks of refugee-led community hubs that have the capacity to organise planned activities that sustainably strengthen the self-determination and well-being of refugee communities over large geographical areas of transit countries.
Find more information here: www.sameskies.org
The first project established by Same Skies became known as Refugee Learning Nest, located in Java, Indonesia. Follow their activities and progress on Facebook: www.facebook.com/refugeelearningnest
1 Anonymous, ‘Migrants Rescued Off Indonesian Coast’, Al Jazeera (20 May 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/scores-refugees-rescued-indonesian-coast-150520021111009.html [accessed:
2 Michael Holtz, ‘Why Southeast Asia Faces a Migration Crisis This Summer’, The Christian Science Monitor, (19 May 2015)
3 Missbach and Sinanu, ‘”The Scum of the Earth”? Foreign People Smugglers and Their Local Counterparts in Indonesia’, pp. 73-
4 Anonymous, ‘Migrants Rescued Off Indonesian Coast’,
5 Holtz, ‘Why Southeast Asia Faces a Migration Crisis This Summer’,
6 UNHCR, Demographic Population Statistics 2014. Available from: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/demographics [accessed 26/07/15]
7 UNHCR, Kementrian Hukum Dan HAM Republik Indonesia, UNHCR: Ada 10.623 Pengungsi dan Pencari Suaka di Indonesia,
(June 6 2014) http://imigrasikarimun.com/2014/06/unhcr-ada-10-623-pengungsi-dan-pencari-suaka-di-indonesia/ [accessed:
8 Jon and Sindo, ‘Sebagaian Masyarakat Mengeluh Adanya Pengungsi Rohingya di Medan’, Infomedan.net, (21 May 2015), http://infomedan.net/sebagian-masyarakat-mengeluh-adanya-pengungsi-rohingya-di-medan.html [accessed 16/06/2015]
9 Antje Missbach, Frieda Sinanu, ‘”The Scum of the Earth”? Foreign People Smugglers and Their Local Counterparts in Indonesia’,
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 30, no. 4 (2011), p. 67.
10 Church World Service, ‘Accessing Services in The City: The Significance of Urban Refugee-Host Relations in Cameroon, Indonesia and Pakistan’ (February 2013), pp. 17-18.
11 Statistics Unit, UNHCR, FICSS@UNHCR.org, 2015. Demographic Statistics for Sumatra Utara. [E-mail] Message to JS Wilson
(email@example.com). Sent 28/07/2015 9.38pm. [Accessed 29 July 15].
12 NB: For asylum seekers that are included, this figure refers to asylum seekers pending a decision on their asylum claim by the end of the reporting year.
13 Satya Festiani, ’85 Sri Lankan Immigrants Detained in Medan’ Republicka Online (19 May 2015),
14 Joe Cochrane, ‘Indonesia and Malaysia Agree to Care for Stranded Migrants’, New York Times, (20 May 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/world/asia/indonesia-malaysia-rohingya-bangladeshi-migrants-agreement.html?_r=0, [accessed: 03/08/2015]
15 Maung Zarni and Alice Cowley, ‘The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohinya’, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, vol.
23, no. 3 (2014), pp. 685-686
16 Human Rights Watch, ‘”All You Can Do is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in
Burma’s Arakan State’, April 2013, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/04/22/all-you-can-do-pray-0. [accessed: 16/07/2015], p. 24.
17 Zarni and Cowley, ‘The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya’, p. 684.
18 Akm Ahsan Ullah, ‘Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization’, Journal of
Immigrant and Refugee Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (2011), p. 143.
19 Utpala Rahman, ‘The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh’, Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, vol. 8, no. 2 (2010), p. 236.
20 Mary Kate Long, ‘Dynamics Of State, Sangha and Society In Myanmar: A Closer Look at the Rohingya Issue’, Asian Journal of
Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 1 (2013), pp. 84-85.
21 Akm Ahsan Ullah, ‘Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization’, p. 150.
22 Ibid. pp. 139-161.
23 Human Rights Watch, “All You Can Do is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s
Arakan State’, p. 81.
24 Ibid, p. 94.
25 Akm Ahsan Ullah, ‘Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization’, p. 150.
26 Ibid. p. 145.
28 Human Rights Watch, ‘”All You Can Do is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in
Burma’s Arakan State’, p. 36.
29 Akm Ahsan Ullah, ‘Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization’, p. 145.
30 Human Rights Watch, ‘”All You Can Do is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in
Burma’s Arakan State’, p. 24.
32 Zarni and Cowley, ‘The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya’, p. 716.
33 Human Rights Watch, ‘”All You Can Do is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in
Burma’s Arakan State’, p. 22.
34Ibid. p. 25.
35 Long, ‘Dynamics Of State, Sangha and Society In Myanmar: A Closer Look at the Rohingya Issue’, p. 85.
36 Zarni and Cowley, ‘The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya’, p. 716.
37 Kristy Crabtree, ‘Economic Challenges and Coping Mechanisms in Protracted Displacement: A Case Study of the Rohingya
Refugees in Bangladesh’, Journal of Muslim Mental Health, vol. 5, no. 1 (2010), p. 42.
38 Akm Ahsan Ullah, ‘Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization’, p. 140.
39 Rahman, ‘The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh’, p. 236.
40 Human Rights Watch, ‘”All You Can Do is Pray”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in
Burma’s Arakan State’, p. 76.
41 Rahman, ‘The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh’, pp. 52-53.
42 Crabtree, ‘Economic Challenges and Coping Mechanisms in Protracted Displacement: A Case Study of the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, p. 42.
43 Samuel Cheung, ‘Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya
Experience’, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (2011), p. 58.
44 Crabtree, ‘Economic Challenges and Coping Mechanisms in Protracted Displacement: A Case Study of the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, p. 47.
45 Cheung, ‘Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience’, p. 53.
46 Crabtree, ‘Economic Challenges and Coping Mechanisms in Protracted Displacement: A Case Study of the Rohingya Refugees
in Bangladesh’, p. 46.
47 Ibid. p. 48.
48 Ibid. p. 46.
49 Bangladesh Monthly Income, 1991-2015, (28 May 2015). [ONLINE] Available at:
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bangladesh/wages. [Accessed 03 September 2015].
50 Crabtree, ‘Economic Challenges and Coping Mechanisms in Protracted Displacement: A Case Study of the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’, p. 42.
52 Jon, ‘Sebagaian Masyarakat Mengeluh Adanya Pengungsi Rohingya di Medan’, Infomedan.net, (21 May 2015), http://infomedan.net/sebagian-masyarakat-mengeluh-adanya-pengungsi-rohingya-di-medan.html [accessed 16/06/2015]
53 Akm Ahsan Ullah, ‘Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization’, pp. 152-153.
54 Cheung, ‘Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience’, p. 53.
55 Akm Ahsan Ullah, ‘Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization’, p. 152.
56 Rahman, ‘The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh’, p. 238.
57 Ibid. p. 52.
58 Cheung, ‘Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience’, p. 61.
60 Missbach and Sinanu, ‘”The Scum of the Earth”? Foreign People Smugglers and Their Local Counterparts in Indonesia’, p. 73.
61 Mubarak, ‘Wagub Resmikan Shelter Rohingya’.